Mr. Leibniz's Second Paper
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1. IT is rightly observed in the Paper delivered to the Princess of Wales, which Her Royal Highness has been pleased to communicate to me, that, next to Corruption of Manners, the Principles of the Materialists do very much contribute to keep up Impiety. But I believe the Author had no reason to add, that the Mathematical Principles of Philosophy are opposite to those of the Materialists. On the contrary, they are the same; only with this difference, that the Materialists, in Imitation of Democritus, Epicurus, and Hobbes, confine themselves altogether to Mathematical Principles, and admit only Bodies; whereas the Christian Mathematicians admit also Immaterial Substances. Wherefore, not Mathematical Principles (according to the usual sense of that Word) but Metaphysical Principles ought to be opposed to thoseof the Materialists. Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle in some measure, had a Knowledge of these Principles; but I pretend to have established them demonstratively in my Theodicæa, though I have done it in a popular manner. The great Foundation of Mathematicks, is the principle of Contradiction, or Identity, that is, that a Proposition cannot be true and false at the same time; and that therefore A is A, and cannot be not A. This single Principle is sufficient to demonstrate every part of Arithmetick and Geometry, that is, all Mathematical Principles. But in order to proceed from Mathematicks to Natural Philosophy, another Principle is requisite, as I have observed in my Theodicæa: I mean, the Principle of a sufficient Reason, viz. that nothing happens without a Reason why it should be so, rather than otherwise. And therefore Archimedes being to proceed from Mathematicks to Natural Philosophy, in his Book De Æquilibrio, was obliged to make use of a particular Case of the great Principle of a sufficient Reason. He takes it for granted, that if there be a  Balance, in which every thing is alike on both Sides, and if equal Weights are hung on the two ends of that Balance, the whole will be at rest. 'Tis because no Reason can be given, why one side should weigh down, rather than the other. Now, by that single Principle, viz. that there ought to be a sufficient Reason why Things should be so, and not otherwise, one may demonstrate the Being of a God, and all the other Parts of Metaphysicks or Natural Theology; and even, in some Measure, those Principles of Natural Philosophy, that are independent upon Mathematicks: I mean, the  Dynamick Principles, or the Principles of Force.
2. The Author proceeds, and says, that according to the Mathematical Principles, that is, according to Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy, (for Mathematical Principles determine nothing in the present Case,) Matter is the most inconsiderable part of the Universe. The reason is, because he admits empty Space, besides Matter; and because, according to his Notions, Matter fills up only a very small part of Space. But Democritus and Epicurus maintained the same Thing: They differ'd from Sir Isaac Newton, only as to the Quantity of Matter; and perhaps they believed there was more Matter in the World, than Sir Isaac Newton will allow: Wherein I think their Opinion ought to be preferred; For, the more Matter there is, the more God has occasion to exercise his Wisdom and Power. Which is one Reason, among others, why I maintain that there is no Vacuum at all.<25>
3. I find, in  express Words, in the Appendix to Sir Isaac Newton's Opticks, that Space is the Sensorium of God. But the Word Sensorium hath always signified the Organ of Sensation. He, and his Friends, may now, if they think fit, explain themselves quite otherwise: I shall not be against it.
4. The Author supposes that the presence of the Soul is sufficient to make it perceive what passes in the Brain. But this is the very Thing which Father Mallebranche, and all the Cartesians deny; and they rightly deny it. More is requisite besides bare presence, to enable One thing to perceive what passes in another. Some Communication, that may be explained; some sort of influence, is requisite for this purpose. Space, according to Sir Isaac Newton, is intimately present to the Body contained in it, and commensurate with it. Does it follow from thence, that Space perceives what passes in a Body; and remembers it, when That Body is gone away? Besides, the Soul being indivisible, its immediate presence, which may be imagined in the Body, would only be in one Point. How then could it perceive what happens out of that Point? I pretend to be the first, who has shown  how the Soul perceives what passes in the Body.<27>
5. The Reason why God perceives every thing, is not His bare Presence, but also his Operation. 'Tis because he preserves Things by an Action, which continually produces whatever is good and perfect in them. But the Soul having  no immediate Influence over the Body, nor the Body over the Soul; their mutual Correspondence cannot be explained by their being present to each other.
6. The true and principal Reason why we commend a Machine, is rather grounded upon the Effects of the Machine, than upon its Cause. We don't enquire so much about the Power of the Artist, as we do about his Skill in his Workmanship. And therefore the Reason alledged by the Author for extolling the Machine of God's making, grounded upon his having made it entirely, without wanting any Materials to make it of; That Reason, I say, is not sufficient. 'Tis a mere Shift the Author has been forced to have recourse to: And the Reason why God exceeds any other Artist, is not only because he makes the Whole, whereas all other Artists must have Matter to work upon. This Excellency in God, would be only on the account of Power. But God's Excellency arises also from another Cause, viz. Wisdom: whereby his Machine lasts longer, and moves more regularly, than those of any other Artist whatsoever. He who buys a Watch, doesnot mind whether the Workman made every Part of it himself, or whether he got the several Parts made by Others, and did only put them together; provided the Watch goes right. And if the Workman had received from God even the Gift of creating the Matter of the Wheels; yet the Buyer of the Watch would not be satisfied, unless the Workman had also received the Gift of putting them well together. In like manner, he who will be pleased with God's Workmanship, cannot be so, without some other Reason than that which the Author has here alleged.
7. Thus the Skill of God must not be inferior to that of a Workman; nay, it must go infinitely beyond it. The bare Production of every thing, would indeed show the Power of God; but it would not sufficiently show his Wisdom. They who maintain the contrary, will fall exactly into the Error of the Materialists, and of Spinoza, from whom they profess to differ. They would, in such case, acknowledge Power, but not sufficient Wisdom, in the Principle or Cause of all Things.
8. I do not say, the Material World is a Machine, or Watch, that goes without God's Interposition; and I have sufficiently insisted, that the Creation wants to be continually influenc'd by its Creator. ButI maintain it to be a Watch, that goes without wanting to be Mended by him: Otherwise we must say, that God bethinks himself again. No; God has foreseen every thing; He has provided a Remedy for every thing before-hand; There is in his Works a Harmony, a Beauty, already pre-established.
9. This Opinion does not exclude God's Providence, or his Government of the World: On the contrary, it makes it perfect. A true Providence of God, requires a perfect Foresight. But then it requires moreover, not only that he should have foreseen every thing; but also that he should have provided for every thing before-hand, with proper Remedies: Otherwise, he must want either Wisdom to foresee Things, or Power to provide against them. He will be like the God of the Socinians, who lives only from day to day, as Mr. Jurieu says. Indeed God, according to the Socinians, does not so much as foresee Inconveniencies; whereas, the Gentlemen I am arguing with, who put him upon Mending his Work, say only, that he does not provide against them. But this seems to me to be still a very great Imperfection. According to This Doctrine, God must want either Power, or Good Will.<33>
10. I don't think I can be rightly blamed, for saying that God is  Intelligentia supramundana. Will they say, that he is Intelligentia Mundana; that is, the Soul of the World? I hope not. However, they will do well to take care, not to fall into that Notion unawares.
11. The Comparison of a King, under whose Reign every thing should go on without his Interposition, is by no means to the present Purpose; since God preserves every thing continually, and nothing can subsist without him. His Kingdom therefore is not a Nominal one. 'Tis just as if one should say, that a King, who should originally have taken care to have his Subjects so well educated, and should, by his Care in providing for their Subsistence, preserve them so well in their Fitness for their several Stations, and in their good Affection towards him, as that he should have no Occasion ever to be amending any thing amongst them; would be only a Nominal King.
12. To conclude. If God is oblig'd to mend the Course of Nature from time to time, it must be done either supernaturally or naturally. If it be done supernaturally, we must have recourse to  Miracles, in order to explain Natural Things: Which is reducing an Hypothesis ad absurdum:For, every thing may easily be accounted for by Miracles. But if it be done naturally, then God will not be  Intelligentia Supramundana: He will be comprehended under the Nature of Things; that is, He will be the Soul of the World.
 See Appendix, No 3.
 See Appendix, No 2.
 See the Note,in Dr. Clarke's First Reply, § 3.
 See Appendix, No 5.
 See Appendix, No. 5.
 See Appendix, No, 1.
 See Appendix, No. 6.
 See Appendix, No. 1.