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<title>Dr. Clarke's Fourth Reply</title>
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<note type="metadataLine">1717, <hi rend="italic">c.</hi> 3,482 words.</note>
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<linkGrp n="document_relations" xml:base="http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/normalized/"><ptr type="next_part" target="THEM00234">Mr. Leibniz's Fifth Paper [<hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)]</ptr><ptr type="parent" target="THEM00224"><hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)</ptr><ptr type="previous_part" target="THEM00232">Mr. Leibniz's Fourth Paper [<hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)]</ptr></linkGrp>
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<change when="2001-01-01" type="metadata">Catalogue information compiled by Rob Iliffe, Peter Spargo &amp; John Young</change>
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<head rend="center" xml:id="hd1"><hi rend="italic">Dr</hi>. <hi rend="smallCaps">Clarke</hi>'<hi rend="italic">s Fourth Reply</hi>.</head>
<p xml:id="par1">1, <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 2. THIS Notion leads to universal <hi rend="italic">Necessity and Fate</hi>, by supposing that <hi rend="italic">Motives</hi> have the same relation to the <hi rend="italic">Will of an Intelligent Agent</hi>, as <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See above, Mr</hi>. Leibnitz'<hi rend="italic">s Second Paper</hi>, § 1.</note> <hi rend="italic">Weights</hi> have to <note n="✝" place="marginRight">See Appendix, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. 3.</note> a <hi rend="italic">Balance</hi>; so that of <hi rend="italic">two</hi> things absolutely indifferent, an Intelligent Agent can <note n="‖" place="marginRight">See Appendix, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi> 4.</note> no more choose <hi rend="italic">Either</hi>, than a Balance can move it self when the Weights on both sides are Equal. But the Difference lies here. A <hi rend="italic">Balance</hi> is no <hi rend="italic">Agent</hi>, but is merely <hi rend="italic">Passive</hi> and <hi rend="italic">acted upon</hi> by the <hi rend="italic">Weights</hi>; so that, when the <hi rend="italic">Weights</hi> are equal, there is <hi rend="italic">nothing</hi> to <hi rend="italic">move</hi> it. But <hi rend="italic">Intelligent Beings</hi> are <hi rend="italic">Agents</hi>; not <hi rend="italic">passive</hi>, in being <hi rend="italic">moved</hi> by <hi rend="italic">Motives</hi>, as a <hi rend="italic">Balance</hi> is by <hi rend="italic">Weights</hi>; but they have <hi rend="italic">Active Powers</hi> and do <hi rend="italic">move Themselves</hi>, sometimes upon the View of <hi rend="italic">strong</hi> Motives, sometimes upon <hi rend="italic">weak</hi> ones, and sometimes where things are <hi rend="italic">absolutely indifferent</hi>. In which <hi rend="italic">latter case</hi>, there may be <hi rend="italic">very good reason</hi> to <hi rend="italic">act</hi>, though two or more <hi rend="italic">Ways</hi> of acting may be absolutely <hi rend="italic">indifferent</hi>. This learned Writer always <hi rend="italic">supposes</hi> the contrary, as a <hi rend="italic">Principle</hi>; but gives no <hi rend="italic">Proof</hi> of it, either <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">from</fw><pb xml:id="p123" n="123"/>from the <hi rend="italic">Nature of Things</hi>, or the <hi rend="italic">Perfections of God</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par2">3, <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 4. This Argument, if it was True, would prove that God neither <hi rend="italic">has created</hi>, nor <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. 9, and 4.</note> <hi rend="italic">can possibly create</hi> any <hi rend="italic">Matter at all</hi>. For the <hi rend="italic">perfectly solid parts</hi> of <hi rend="italic">all</hi> Matter, if you take them of equal Figure and Dimensions (which is always <hi rend="italic">possible</hi> in Supposition,) are exactly alike; and therefore it would be perfectly indifferent if they were transposed in Place; and consequently it was <hi rend="italic">impossible</hi> (according to this Learned Author's Argument,) for God to place them in those Places wherein he did actually place them at the Creation, because he might as easily have transposed their Situation. 'Tis very true, that <hi rend="italic">no two Leaves</hi>, and perhaps <hi rend="italic">no two drops of Water</hi> are exactly alike; because they are <hi rend="italic">Bodies very much compounded</hi>. But the case is very different in the parts of <hi rend="italic">simple solid Matter</hi>. And even in <hi rend="italic">Compounds</hi>, there is no impossibility for God to make <hi rend="italic">two drops of Water</hi> exactly alike. And if he <hi rend="italic">should</hi> make them <hi rend="italic">exactly alike</hi>, yet they would never the more become <hi rend="italic">one and the same</hi> drop of Water, because they were <hi rend="italic">alike</hi>. Nor would the <hi rend="italic">Place</hi> of the <hi rend="italic">One</hi>, be the <hi rend="italic">Place</hi> of the <hi rend="italic">Other</hi>; though it was absolutely indifferent, <hi rend="italic">which</hi> was placed in <hi rend="italic">which place</hi>. <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">The</fw><pb xml:id="p125" n="125"/>The same Reasoning holds likewise concerning the original <hi rend="italic">determination</hi> of <hi rend="italic">Motion</hi>, this way or the contrary way.</p>
<p xml:id="par3">5. and 6. <hi rend="italic">Two things</hi>, by being <hi rend="italic">exactly alike</hi>, do not cease to be <hi rend="italic">Two</hi>. The parts of <hi rend="italic">Time</hi>, are as exactly <hi rend="italic">like</hi> to each other, as those of <hi rend="italic">Space:</hi> Yet <hi rend="italic">two Points</hi> of <hi rend="italic">Time</hi>, are not the <hi rend="italic">same Point</hi> of Time, nor are they <hi rend="italic">two Names of only the same Point of Time</hi>. Had God created the World <hi rend="italic">but This Moment</hi>, it would not have been created at the Time it was created. And if God <hi rend="italic">has made</hi> (or <hi rend="italic">can</hi> make) Matter <hi rend="italic">Finite</hi> in Dimensions, the <hi rend="italic">material Universe</hi> must consequently be in its Nature <hi rend="italic">Moveable</hi>; For nothing that is finite, is <hi rend="italic">immoveable</hi>. To say therefore that God could not have altered the <hi rend="italic">Time</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Place</hi> of the existence of Matter, is making Matter to be necessarily Infinite and Eternal, and reducing all things to <hi rend="italic">Necessity</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Fate</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par4">7. <hi rend="italic">Extra-mundane Space</hi>, (if the material World be <hi rend="italic">Finite</hi> in its Dimensions,) is not <hi rend="italic">imaginary</hi>, but <hi rend="italic">real</hi>. Nor are void Spaces <hi rend="italic">in</hi> the World, merely imaginary. In an <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">* <hi rend="italic">exhausted</hi></fw><pb xml:id="p127" n="127"/> <note n="*"><hi rend="italic">This was occasioned by a Passage in the Private Letter, wherein Mr.</hi> Leibnitz'<hi rend="italic">s Paper came inclosed</hi>.</note> <hi rend="italic">exhausted Receiver</hi>, though Rays of Light, and perhaps some Other Matter, be There in an exceeding small Quantity; yet the <hi rend="italic">want of Resistence</hi> plainly shows, that the <hi rend="italic">greatest part</hi> of That Space is void of Matter. For <hi rend="italic">Subtleness</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Fineness</hi> of Matter, cannot be the cause of <hi rend="italic">want of Resistence</hi>. <hi rend="italic">Quicksilver</hi> is as <hi rend="italic">subtle</hi>, and consists of as <hi rend="italic">fine</hi> parts and as <hi rend="italic">fluid</hi>, as <hi rend="italic">Water</hi>; and yet makes more than <hi rend="italic">ten times</hi> the resistence: Which resistence arises therefore from the <hi rend="italic">Quantity</hi>, and not from the <hi rend="italic">Grossness</hi> of the Matter.</p>
<p xml:id="par5">8. <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> void of Body, is the Property of an <hi rend="italic">incorporeal</hi> Substance. Space is not <hi rend="italic">Bounded</hi> by <hi rend="italic">Bodies</hi>, but exists equally <hi rend="italic">within</hi> and <hi rend="italic">without</hi> Bodies. <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> is not <hi rend="italic">inclosed between</hi> Bodies; but Bodies, existing in unbounded Space, are, <hi rend="italic">themselves only</hi>, terminated by their own Dimensions.</p>
<p xml:id="par6">9. Void Space, is not an <hi rend="italic">Attribute without a Subject</hi>; because, by <hi rend="italic">void Space</hi>, we never mean <hi rend="italic">Space void of every thing</hi>, but void of <hi rend="italic">Body</hi> only. In All void <hi rend="italic">Space, God</hi> is <hi rend="italic">certainly</hi> present, and <hi rend="italic">possibly</hi> many <hi rend="italic">other</hi> Substances which are not Matter; <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">being</fw><pb xml:id="p129" n="129"/> being neither <hi rend="italic">Tangible</hi>, nor Objects of Any of <hi rend="italic">Our</hi> Senses.</p>
<p xml:id="par7">10. <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> is not a <hi rend="italic">Substance</hi>, but a <hi rend="italic">Property</hi>; And if it be a <hi rend="italic">Property</hi> of That which is necessary, it will consequently (as all <hi rend="italic">other</hi> Properties of That which is necessary must do,) exist <hi rend="italic">more necessarily</hi>, (though it be not <hi rend="italic">itself</hi> a Substance,) than those <hi rend="italic">Substances Themselves</hi> which are <hi rend="italic">not necessary</hi>. Space is <hi rend="italic">immense</hi>, and <hi rend="italic">immutable</hi>, and <hi rend="italic">eternal</hi>; and so also is <hi rend="italic">Duration</hi>. Yet it does not at all from hence follow, that any thing is eternal <hi rend="italic">hors de Dieu</hi>. For <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Duration</hi> are not <hi rend="italic">hors de Dieu</hi>, but <note n="*">Deus <hi rend="italic">Æternus</hi> est &amp; <hi rend="italic">Infinitus, Omnipotens</hi> &amp; <hi rend="italic">Omnisciens</hi>; id est, durat ab æterno in æternum, &amp; adest ab infinito in infinitum; omnia regit &amp; omnia cognoscit, quæ fiunt aut sciri possunt. Non est <hi rend="italic">Æternitas</hi> vel <hi rend="italic">Infinitas </hi>, sed <hi rend="italic">Æternus</hi> &amp; <hi rend="italic">Infinitus</hi>; non est <hi rend="italic">Duratio</hi> vel <hi rend="italic">Spatium </hi>, sed <hi rend="italic">durat</hi> &amp; <hi rend="italic">adest</hi>. Durat <hi rend="italic">Semper</hi>, &amp; Adest <hi rend="italic">Ubique</hi>; &amp; existendo semper &amp; ubique, <hi rend="italic">Durationem</hi> &amp; <hi rend="italic">Spatium</hi>, æternitatem &amp; infinitatem constituit. Cùm unaquæ<choice><abbr>q;</abbr><expan>que</expan></choice> Spatii particula sit <hi rend="italic">semper</hi>, &amp; unumquod<choice><abbr>q;</abbr><expan>que</expan></choice> Durationis indivisibile momentum <hi rend="italic">Ubique</hi>; certè rerum omnium Fabricator ac Dominus, non erit <hi rend="italic">nunquam nusquam</hi>. Omnipræsens est, non per <hi rend="italic">Virtutem</hi> solam, sed etiam per <hi rend="italic">Substantiam:</hi> Nam Virtus sine Substantiâ subsistere non potest, <hi rend="italic">i. e. God is</hi> Eternal <hi rend="italic">and</hi> Infinite, Omnipotent <hi rend="italic">and</hi> Omniscient: <hi rend="italic">That is, he endures from Everlasting to Everlasting</hi>, <hi rend="italic">and is present from Infinity to Infinity: He governs all things which are</hi>, <hi rend="italic">and knows all <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">things</fw><pb xml:id="p131-note" n="131"/>things which are possible to be known</hi>. <hi rend="italic">He is not</hi> Eternity <hi rend="italic">or</hi> Infinity, <hi rend="italic">but</hi> Eternal <hi rend="italic"><choice><sic>aud</sic><corr>and</corr></choice></hi> Infinite. <hi rend="italic">He is not</hi> Duration, <hi rend="italic">or</hi> Space; <hi rend="italic">but he</hi> endures, <hi rend="italic">and</hi> is Present. <hi rend="italic">He endures</hi> Always, <hi rend="italic">and is Present</hi> every where; <hi rend="italic">and, by existing always and every where</hi>, <hi rend="italic">constitutes</hi> Duration <hi rend="italic">and</hi> Space, <hi rend="italic">Eternity and Infinity</hi>. <hi rend="italic">Seeing every particle of Space is</hi> Always, <hi rend="italic">and every indivisible Moment of Duration is</hi> every where; <hi rend="italic">surely it cannot be said of the Maker and Lord of all Things, that he is</hi> [at no Time, <hi rend="italic">and</hi> in no Place,] Never <hi rend="italic">and</hi> Nowhere. <hi rend="italic">He is Omnipresent, not only</hi> Virtually, <hi rend="italic">but</hi> Substantially: <hi rend="italic">For</hi> Power <hi rend="italic">cannot subsist without a</hi> Substance. Newtoni Principia, Schol. generale sub finem.</note> are <hi rend="italic">caused by</hi>, and are <hi rend="italic">immediate and neces<lb type="hyphenated" xml:id="l1"/><fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">sary</fw><pb xml:id="p131" n="131"/>sary Consequences of</hi> His Existence. And <hi rend="italic">without</hi> them, his <hi rend="italic">Eternity</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Ubiquity</hi> [or <hi rend="italic">Omnipresence</hi>] would be taken away.</p>
<p xml:id="par8">11, <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 12. <hi rend="italic">Infinites</hi> are composed of <hi rend="italic">Finites</hi>, in no other sense, than as <hi rend="italic">Finites</hi> are composed of <hi rend="italic">infinitesimals</hi>. In what sense Space <hi rend="italic">has</hi> or <hi rend="italic">has not Parts</hi>, has been explained before, <hi rend="italic">Reply</hi> 3<hi rend="italic">d</hi>, § 3. <hi rend="italic">Parts</hi>, in the <hi rend="italic">corporeal</hi> Sense of the Word, are <hi rend="italic">separable, compounded, ununited, independent on, and moveable from each other:</hi> But infinite Space, though it may by Us be <hi rend="italic">partially apprehended</hi>, that is, may in our Imagination be conceived as composed of <hi rend="italic">Parts</hi>; yet Those <hi rend="italic">Parts</hi> (<hi rend="italic">improperly</hi> so called) being <hi rend="italic">essentially indiscerpible</hi> and <hi rend="italic">immoveable</hi> from each other, and not <hi rend="italic">partable</hi> without an express Contradiction in Terms, [<hi rend="italic">See above, Reply</hi> II, § 4. and <hi rend="italic">Reply</hi> III, § 3;] <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> consequently is in itself <hi rend="italic">essentially One</hi>, and <hi rend="italic">absolutely indivisible</hi>.</p>
<fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">13. If</fw><pb xml:id="p133" n="133"/>
<p xml:id="par9">13. If the World be <hi rend="italic">Finite</hi> in Dimensions, it is <hi rend="italic">moveable</hi> by the Power of God; and therefore my Argument drawn from that <hi rend="italic">moveableness</hi>, is conclusive. Two <hi rend="italic">places</hi>, though <hi rend="italic">exactly alike</hi>, are not the <hi rend="italic">same place</hi>. Nor is the <hi rend="italic">Motion</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Rest</hi> of the Universe, the <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi> 10.</note> <hi rend="italic">same State</hi>; any more than the <hi rend="italic">Motion</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Rest</hi> of a <hi rend="italic">Ship</hi>, is the <hi rend="italic">same State</hi>, because a Man shut up in the Cabbin cannot perceive whether the Ship sails or not, so long as it moves uniformly. The <hi rend="italic">Motion</hi> of the <hi rend="italic">Ship</hi>, though the Man perceives it not, is a <hi rend="italic">real different State</hi>, and has <hi rend="italic">real different Effects</hi>; and, upon a <hi rend="italic">sudden stop</hi>, it would have <hi rend="italic">Other real Effects</hi>; And so likewise would an indiscernable Motion of the <hi rend="italic">Universe</hi>. To This Argument, no Answer has ever been given. It is largely insisted on by Sir <hi rend="italic">Isaac Newton</hi> in his <hi rend="italic">Mathematical Principles</hi>, (<hi rend="italic">Definit</hi>. 8.) where, from the Consideration of the <hi rend="italic">Properties, Causes</hi>, and <hi rend="italic">Effects</hi> of Motion, he shows the difference between <hi rend="italic">real Motion</hi>, or a Bodie's being carried from one part of Space to another; and <hi rend="italic">relative Motion</hi>, which is merely a change of the <hi rend="italic">Order</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Situation</hi> of Bodies with <hi rend="italic">respect to each other</hi>. This Argument is a Mathematical one; showing, from <hi rend="italic">real Effects</hi>, that there may be <hi rend="italic">real Motion</hi> where there is <hi rend="italic">none relative</hi>; and <hi rend="italic">relative Motion</hi>, where there is <hi rend="italic"><fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">none</fw><pb xml:id="p135" n="135"/>none real:</hi> And is not to be answered, by barely <hi rend="italic">asserting</hi> the contrary.</p>
<p xml:id="par10">14. The <hi rend="italic">reality of Space</hi> is not a <hi rend="italic">Supposition</hi>, but is <hi rend="italic">proved</hi> by the fore-going Arguments, to which no Answer has been given. Nor is any Answer given to That other Argument, that <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Time</hi> are <hi rend="italic">Quantities</hi>, which <hi rend="italic">Situation</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Order</hi> are <hi rend="italic">not</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par11">15. It was <hi rend="italic">no impossibility</hi> for God to make the World <hi rend="italic">sooner</hi> or <hi rend="italic">later</hi> than he did: Nor is it at all <hi rend="italic">impossible</hi> for him to destroy it <hi rend="italic">sooner</hi> or <hi rend="italic">later</hi> than it shall actually be destroyed. As to the Notion of the <hi rend="italic">World</hi>'s <hi rend="italic">Eternity</hi>; They who suppose <hi rend="italic">Matter</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> to be the same, <hi rend="italic">must</hi> indeed suppose the World to be not only <hi rend="italic">Infinite</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Eternal</hi>, but <hi rend="italic">necessarily</hi> so; even as necessarily as <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Duration</hi>, which depend not on the <hi rend="italic">Will</hi>, but on the <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See above, the Note on</hi> § 10.</note> <hi rend="italic">Existence</hi> of God. But they who believe that God created Matter in what <hi rend="italic">Quantity</hi>, and at what particular <hi rend="italic">Time</hi>, and in what particular <hi rend="italic">Spaces</hi> he <hi rend="italic">pleased</hi>, are here under no difficulty. For the Wisdom of God may have <hi rend="italic">very good reasons</hi> for creating <hi rend="italic">This World</hi>, <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">at</fw><pb xml:id="p137" n="137"/> at <hi rend="italic">That particular Time</hi> he did; and may have made <hi rend="italic">other kinds of things</hi> Before this <hi rend="italic">material World</hi> began, and may make <hi rend="italic">other kinds of things</hi> After <hi rend="italic">This World</hi> is destroyed.</p>
<p xml:id="par12">16. <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 17. That <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Time</hi> are not the <hi rend="italic">mere Order</hi> of things, but real <hi rend="italic">Quantities</hi>, (which Order and Situation are not;) has been proved <hi rend="italic">above</hi>, (See <hi rend="italic">Third Reply</hi>, § 4; and in <hi rend="italic">This Paper</hi>, § 13.) and no Answer yet given to those Proofs. And till an Answer be given to those Proofs, this learned Author's assertion is (by <hi rend="italic">his own Confession</hi> in this place) a <hi rend="italic">Contradiction</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par13">18. The <hi rend="italic">Uniformity</hi> of <hi rend="italic">all</hi> the parts of Space, is no Argument against God's acting in <hi rend="italic">Any</hi> part, after what manner he pleases. God may have <hi rend="italic">good reasons</hi> to create <hi rend="italic">finite</hi> Beings, and Finite Beings can be but in <hi rend="italic">particular Places</hi>. And, <hi rend="italic">all</hi> places being originally alike, (even though <hi rend="italic">Place</hi> were nothing else but the Situation of Bodies;) God's placing <hi rend="italic">one cube of matter</hi> behind <hi rend="italic">another equal cube of matter</hi>, rather than the <hi rend="italic">other</hi> behind <hi rend="italic">That</hi>; is a <hi rend="italic">choice</hi> no way unworthy of the Perfections of God, though <hi rend="italic">Both these Situations</hi> be <hi rend="italic">perfectly equal</hi>: Because there may be <hi rend="italic">very good reasons</hi> why <hi rend="italic">Both the Cubes</hi> should exist, <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">and</fw><pb xml:id="p139" n="139"/> and they cannot exist but in <hi rend="italic">one</hi> or <hi rend="italic">other</hi> of equally reasonable Situations. The <hi rend="italic">Epicurean Chance</hi>, is not a <hi rend="italic">Choice</hi> of <hi rend="italic">Will</hi>, but a <hi rend="italic">blind Necessity</hi> of <hi rend="italic">Fate</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par14">19. This Argument, (as I now observed, § 3,) if it proves any thing, proves that God neither <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi> 4, <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 9.</note> <hi rend="italic">did</hi> nor <hi rend="italic">can</hi> create any <hi rend="italic">matter</hi> at all; because the <hi rend="italic">Situation</hi> of equal and similar parts of matter, could not but be originally <hi rend="italic">indifferent:</hi> As was also the original <hi rend="italic">Determination</hi> of their <hi rend="italic">Motions</hi>, this way, or the contrary Way.</p>
<p xml:id="par15">20. What <hi rend="italic">This</hi> tends to prove, with regard to the argument before us; I understand not.</p>
<p xml:id="par16">21. That <hi rend="italic">God Cannot limit the Quantity of Matter</hi>, is an Assertion of too great Consequence, to be admitted without <hi rend="italic">Proof</hi>. If he cannot limit the <hi rend="italic">Duration</hi> of it neither, then the material World is both infinite and eternal <hi rend="italic">necessarily</hi> and <hi rend="italic">independently upon God</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par17">22, <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 23. This Argument, if it were good, would prove that Whatever God <hi rend="italic">can</hi> do, he <hi rend="italic">cannot but do</hi>; and consequently that he <hi rend="italic">cannot but</hi> make <hi rend="italic">every thing infinite</hi>, and <hi rend="italic">every thing eternal</hi>. Which is making <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">him</fw><pb xml:id="p141" n="141"/> him no <hi rend="italic">Governor</hi> at all, but a <hi rend="italic">mere necessary Agent</hi>, that is, indeed <hi rend="italic">no Agent at all</hi>, but mere <hi rend="italic">Fate</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Nature</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Necessity</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par18">24, ———— 28. Concerning the Use of the word, <hi rend="italic">Sensory</hi>; (though Sir <hi rend="italic">Isaac Newton</hi> says only, <hi rend="italic">as it were</hi> the <hi rend="italic">Sensory</hi>;) enough has been said in my <hi rend="italic">Third Reply</hi>, § 10; and <hi rend="italic">Second Reply</hi>, § 3; and <hi rend="italic">First Reply</hi>, § 3.</p>
<p xml:id="par19">29. <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> is the <hi rend="italic">Place</hi> of <hi rend="italic">All Things</hi>, and of <hi rend="italic">All Ideas</hi>: Just as <hi rend="italic">Duration</hi> is the <hi rend="italic">Duration</hi> of <hi rend="italic">All Things</hi>, and of <hi rend="italic">All Ideas</hi>. That This has no Tendency to make God <hi rend="italic">the Soul</hi> of the World, <hi rend="italic">See above Reply</hi> II, § 12. There is no <hi rend="italic">Union</hi> between <hi rend="italic">God</hi> and the <hi rend="italic">World</hi>. The <hi rend="italic">Mind of Man</hi> might with greater Propriety be stiled <hi rend="italic">The Soul of the Images of things which it perceives</hi>, than <hi rend="italic">God</hi> can be stiled the <hi rend="italic">Soul</hi> of the <hi rend="italic">World</hi>, to which he is <hi rend="italic">present</hi> throughout, and <hi rend="italic">acts upon it</hi> as he pleases, without being <hi rend="italic">acted upon by it</hi>. Though this Answer was given before, (<hi rend="italic">Reply</hi> II, § 12.) yet the same Objection is repeated again and again, without taking any Notice of the Answer.</p>
<fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">30. What</fw><pb xml:id="p143" n="143"/>
<p xml:id="par20">30. What is meant by <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi> 11.</note> <hi rend="italic">representative Principle</hi>, I understand not. The <hi rend="italic">Soul</hi> discerns things, by having the <hi rend="italic">Images</hi> of things conveyed to it through the Organs of Sense: <hi rend="italic">God</hi> discerns things, by being present <hi rend="italic">to</hi> and <hi rend="italic">in</hi> the <hi rend="italic">Substances</hi> of the Things themselves. Not by <hi rend="italic">producing them continually</hi>; (for he <hi rend="italic">rests</hi> now from his work of <hi rend="italic">Creation</hi>:) but by being <hi rend="italic">continually</hi> omnipresent to every thing which he <hi rend="italic">created at the Beginning</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par21">31. That the Soul <note n="✝" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi> 5.</note> should <hi rend="italic">not operate</hi> upon the Body; and yet the Body, by mere mechanical impulse of Matter, conform itself to the Will of the Soul in all the <hi rend="italic">infinite variety</hi> of spontaneous Animal-Motion; is a <hi rend="italic">perpetual Miracle</hi>. <hi rend="italic">Pre-established Harmony</hi>, is a mere <hi rend="italic">Word</hi> or Term of Art, and does nothing towards explaining the cause of so miraculous an effect.</p>
<p xml:id="par22">32. To suppose that in spontaneous Animal-Motion, the Soul gives <hi rend="italic">no new Motion</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Impression</hi> to Matter; but that all spontaneous Animal-Motion is performed by <hi rend="italic">mechanical impulse of Matter</hi>; is reducing all things to mere Fate and Necessity. God's <hi rend="italic">acting</hi> in the World upon every thing, after what manner he pleases, <hi rend="italic">without</hi> any <hi rend="italic">Union</hi>, and <hi rend="italic">without</hi> being <hi rend="italic">acted upon</hi> by any thing; shews plainly the <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">difference</fw><pb xml:id="p145" n="145"/> difference between an <hi rend="italic">Omnipresent Governor</hi>, and an imaginary <hi rend="italic">Soul of the World</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par23">33. Every <hi rend="italic">Action</hi> is (in the nature of things) the giving of a <hi rend="italic">new Force</hi> to the thing <hi rend="italic">acted upon</hi>. Otherwise 'tis not really <hi rend="italic">Action</hi>, but mere <hi rend="italic">passiveness</hi>; as in the case of all <hi rend="italic">mechanical and inanimate communications</hi> of Motion. If therefore the <hi rend="italic">Giving a new Force</hi>, be <hi rend="italic">supernatural</hi>; then <hi rend="italic">every action</hi> of <hi rend="italic">God</hi> is <hi rend="italic">supernatural</hi>, and he is quite excluded from the Government of the <hi rend="italic">natural World:</hi> And every <hi rend="italic">action of Man</hi>, is either <hi rend="italic">supernatural</hi>, or else <hi rend="italic">Man</hi> is as mere a <hi rend="italic">Machine</hi> as a Clock.</p>
<p xml:id="par24">34, and 35. The <hi rend="italic">difference</hi> between the true Notion of <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, and that of a <hi rend="italic">Soul of the World</hi>, has been before shown: <hi rend="italic">Reply</hi> II, § 12. and in <hi rend="italic">This Paper</hi>, § 29 and 32.</p>
<p xml:id="par25">36. This has been answered just above, § 31.</p>
<p xml:id="par26">37. The Soul is not <hi rend="italic">diffused through the Brain</hi>; but is present to That particular Place, which is the <hi rend="italic">Sensorium</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par27">38. This is a bare <hi rend="italic">Assertion</hi>, without <hi rend="italic">Proof</hi>. Two Bodies, void of Elasticity, meeting each other with equal contrary Forces, Both lose their Motion. And Sir <hi rend="italic">Isaac</hi> <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight"><hi rend="italic">Newton</hi></fw><pb xml:id="p147" n="147"/> <hi rend="italic">Newton</hi> has given a <hi rend="italic">Mathematical</hi> Instance, (<hi rend="italic">page</hi> 341, <hi rend="italic">of the Latin Edition of his Opticks</hi>,) wherein <hi rend="italic">Motion</hi> is continually <hi rend="italic">diminishing</hi> and <hi rend="italic">increasing</hi> in <hi rend="italic">Quantity</hi>, without any communication thereof to other Bodies.</p>
<p xml:id="par28">39. This is no <hi rend="italic">Defect</hi>, as is here supposed; but 'tis the <hi rend="italic">just and proper</hi> Nature of <hi rend="italic">inert Matter</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par29">40. This Argument (if it be good,) proves that the <hi rend="italic">Material</hi> World <hi rend="italic">must</hi> be <hi rend="italic">infinite</hi>, and that it <hi rend="italic">must have been from eternity</hi>, and <hi rend="italic">must continue to eternity:</hi> And that God <hi rend="italic">must Always</hi> have created as <hi rend="italic">many Men</hi>, and as <hi rend="italic">many</hi> of all other things, as 'twas <hi rend="italic">possible</hi> for him to create; and for as long a <hi rend="italic">time</hi> also, as it was <hi rend="italic">possible</hi> for him to do it.</p>
<p xml:id="par30">41. What the meaning of these Words is; <hi rend="italic">An Order</hi>, (or Situation,) <hi rend="italic">which makes Bodies to be Situable</hi>; I understand not. It seems to me to amount to This, that <hi rend="italic">Situation</hi> is the cause of <hi rend="italic">Situation</hi>. That <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> is not merely the <hi rend="italic">Order of Bodies</hi>, has been shown before; <hi rend="italic">Reply</hi> III, § 2 <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 4. And that no Answer has been given to the Arguments there offered, has been shown in <hi rend="italic">This Paper</hi>, § 13 <hi rend="italic">and</hi> 14. Also that <hi rend="italic">Time</hi> is not merely the <hi rend="italic">Order of things succeeding each other</hi>, is evident; because the <hi rend="italic">Quantity</hi> of Time may be <hi rend="italic">greater</hi> or <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight"><hi rend="italic">less</hi>,</fw><pb xml:id="p149" n="149"/> <hi rend="italic">less</hi>, and yet <hi rend="italic">That Order</hi> continue the <hi rend="italic">same</hi>. The <hi rend="italic">Order of things succeeding each other in Time</hi>, is not <hi rend="italic">Time itself:</hi> For they may succeed each other <hi rend="italic">faster</hi> or <hi rend="italic">slower</hi> in the same <hi rend="italic">Order of Succession</hi>, but not in the same <hi rend="italic">Time</hi>. If <hi rend="italic">no Creatures</hi> existed, yet the <hi rend="italic">Ubiquity</hi> of God, and the <hi rend="italic">Continuance of his Existence</hi>, would make <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See above, the Note on</hi> § 10.</note> <hi rend="italic">Space</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Duration</hi> to be exactly the same as they are <hi rend="italic">Now</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par31">42. This is appealing from <hi rend="italic">Reason</hi> to <hi rend="italic">vulgar Opinion</hi>; which <hi rend="italic">Philosophers</hi> should not do, because it is not the <hi rend="italic">Rule</hi> of <hi rend="italic">Truth</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par32">43. <hi rend="italic">Unusualness</hi> is <hi rend="italic">necessarily</hi> included in the Notion of a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi>. For otherwise there is nothing more <hi rend="italic">wonderful</hi>, nor that requires <hi rend="italic">greater Power</hi> to effect, than some of those things we call <hi rend="italic">natural</hi>. Such as, the <hi rend="italic">Motions</hi> of the <hi rend="italic">Heavenly-Bodies</hi>, the <hi rend="italic">Generation</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Formation</hi> of <hi rend="italic">Plants and Animals</hi>, &amp;c. Yet these are for <hi rend="italic">this only reason</hi> not <hi rend="italic">Miracles</hi>, because they are <hi rend="italic">common</hi>. Nevertheless, it does not follow, that every thing which is <hi rend="italic">unusual</hi>, is <hi rend="italic">therefore</hi> a Miracle. For it may be only the irregular and more <hi rend="italic">rare</hi> effect of <hi rend="italic">usual</hi> Causes: Of which kind are <hi rend="italic">Eclipses, Monstrous Births, Madness in Men</hi>, and innu<lb type="hyphenated" xml:id="l2"/><fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">merable</fw><pb xml:id="p151" n="151"/>merable things which the Vulgar call <hi rend="italic">Prodigies</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par33">44. This is a <hi rend="italic">Concession</hi> of what I alleged. And yet 'tis <hi rend="italic">contrary</hi> to the <hi rend="italic">common Opinion</hi> of Divines, to suppose that an <hi rend="italic">Angel</hi> can work a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par34">45. That <hi rend="italic">One Body</hi> should <hi rend="italic">attract</hi> another <hi rend="italic">without any</hi> intermediate <hi rend="italic">Means</hi>, is indeed not a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi>, but a <hi rend="italic">Contradiction:</hi> For 'tis supposing something to <hi rend="italic">act</hi> where it <hi rend="italic">is not</hi>. But the <hi rend="italic">Means</hi> by which Two Bodies attract each other, may be <hi rend="italic">invisible</hi> and <hi rend="italic">intangible</hi>, and of a different nature from <hi rend="italic">mechanism</hi>; and yet, acting regularly and constantly, may well be called <hi rend="italic">natural</hi>; being much less wonderful than <hi rend="italic">Animal-motion</hi>, which yet is <hi rend="italic">never</hi> called a <hi rend="italic">Miracle</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par35">46. If the word, <hi rend="italic">natural Forces</hi>, means here <hi rend="italic">Mechanical</hi>; then all <hi rend="italic">Animals</hi>, and even <hi rend="italic">Men</hi>, are as <hi rend="italic">mere Machines</hi> as a <hi rend="italic">Clock</hi>. But if the word does not mean, <hi rend="italic">mechanical Forces</hi>; then <hi rend="italic">Gravitation</hi> may be effected by <hi rend="italic">regular</hi> and <hi rend="italic">natural</hi> Powers, though they be <hi rend="italic">not Mechanical</hi>.</p>
<p xml:id="par36"><hi rend="smaller">N. B. <hi rend="italic">The Arguments alleged in the Postscript to Mr</hi>. Leibnitz'<hi rend="italic">s Fourth Paper, have been already answered in the foregoing Replies. All that needs here to be observed, is, that his Notion concerning the Impossibility of</hi> Physical Atomes, <hi rend="italic">(for the Question is not about</hi> Mathematical Atomes,) <hi rend="italic">is a manifest Absurdity. For either there</hi> are, <hi rend="italic">or there</hi> are not <hi rend="italic">any</hi> perfectly solid particles <hi rend="italic">of Matter. If there</hi> are <hi rend="italic">any such; then the</hi> parts <hi rend="italic">of such perfectly solid particles, taken of</hi> <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">equal</fw><pb xml:id="p153" n="153"/><hi rend="italic">equal Figure and Dimensions, (which is always</hi> possible <hi rend="italic">in Supposition,) are</hi> Physical Atoms perfectly alike. <hi rend="italic">But if there be</hi> No such perfectly solid particles, <hi rend="italic">then there is no</hi> Matter <hi rend="italic">at all in the Universe. For, the further the Division and Subdivision of the parts of any Body is carried, before you arrive at parts perfectly solid and without Pores; the greater is the Proportion of Pores to solid matter in That Body. If therefore, carrying on the Division</hi> in infinitum, <hi rend="italic">you never arrive at parts perfectly solid and without Pores; it will follow that All Bodies consist of</hi> Pores only, <hi rend="italic">without</hi> any Matter at all: <hi rend="italic">Which is a manifest Absurdity</hi>.</hi></p>
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