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<title>Dr. Clarke's First Reply</title>
<author xml:id="sc"><persName key="nameid_38" sort="Clarke, Samuel" ref="nameid_38" xml:base="http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/catalogue/xml/persNames.xml">Samuel Clarke</persName></author>

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<note type="metadataLine">1717, <hi rend="italic">c.</hi> 1,081 words.</note>
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<linkGrp n="document_relations" xml:base="http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/normalized/"><ptr type="next_part" target="THEM00228">Mr. Leibniz's Second Paper [<hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)]</ptr><ptr type="parent" target="THEM00224"><hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)</ptr><ptr type="previous_part" target="THEM00226">Mr. Leibniz's First Paper [<hi rend="italic">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</hi> (1717)]</ptr></linkGrp>
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<title>A Collection of Papers, Which passed between the late Learned Mr. Leibniz, and Dr. Clarke, In the Years 1715 and 1716</title>
<title type="short">Collection of Papers [Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]</title>
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<change when="2001-01-01" type="metadata">Catalogue information compiled by Rob Iliffe, Peter Spargo &amp; John Young</change>
<change when="2005-10-01">Base Text of 1738 edition transcribed by <name xml:id="ET">Emily Tector</name></change>
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<head rend="center" xml:id="hd1"><hi rend="italic">Dr</hi>. <hi rend="smallCaps">Clarke'</hi><hi rend="italic">s First Reply</hi>.</head>
<p xml:id="par1">1. THAT there are some in <hi rend="italic">England</hi>, as well as in other Countries, who deny or very much corrupt even <hi rend="italic">Natural Religion it self</hi>, is very true, and much to be lamented. But (next to the vitious Affections of Men) this is to be principally ascribed to the false Philosophy of the <hi rend="italic">Materialists</hi>, to which <hi rend="italic">the Mathematick Principles of Philosophy</hi> are the most directly repugnant. That Some make the <hi rend="italic">Souls of Men</hi>, and Others even <hi rend="italic">God</hi> himself to be a Corporeal Being; is also very true: But those who do so, are the great Enemies of the <hi rend="italic">Mathematical Principles of Philosophy</hi>; which Principles, and which alone, prove Matter, or Body, to be the smallest and most inconsiderable Part of the Universe.</p>
<p xml:id="par2">2. That Mr. <hi rend="italic">Locke doubted</hi> whether the <hi rend="italic">Soul</hi> was <hi rend="italic">immaterial</hi> or no, may justly be suspected from some Parts of his Writings: But herein he has been followed only by some <hi rend="italic">Materialists</hi>, Enemies to the <hi rend="italic">Mathematical Principles of Philosophy</hi>; and who <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">ap-</fw><pb xml:id="p11" n="11"/>approve little or nothing in Mr. <hi rend="italic">Locke</hi>'s Writings, but his Errors. </p>
<p xml:id="par3">3. Sir <hi rend="italic">Isaac Newton</hi> doth not say, that Space is the <hi rend="italic">Organ</hi> which God makes use of to perceive Things by; nor that he has need of any <hi rend="italic">Medium</hi> at all, whereby to perceive Things: But on the contrary, that he, being <hi rend="italic">Omnipresent</hi>, perceives all Things by his immediate Presence to them, in all Space whereever they are, without the Intervention or Assistance of any <hi rend="italic">Organ</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Medium</hi> whatsoever. In order to make this more intelligible, he illustrates it by a <hi rend="italic">Similitude</hi>: That as the Mind  of Man, by its immediate Presence to the <hi rend="italic">Pictures</hi> or <hi rend="italic">Images</hi> of Things, form'd in the Brain by the means of the Organs of Sensation, sees those <hi rend="italic">Pictures</hi> as if they were the Things themselves; so God sees <hi rend="italic">all Things</hi>, by his immediate Presence to them: he being actually present to the <hi rend="italic">Things themselves</hi>, to all Things in the Universe; as the Mind of Man is present to all the <hi rend="italic">Pictures of Things</hi> formed in his Brain. Sir <hi rend="italic">Isaac Newton</hi> considers the Brain and Organs of Sensation, as the Means <hi rend="italic">by which those Pictures are formed</hi>; but not as the Means <hi rend="italic">by which the Mind sees or perceives</hi> those Pictures, when they are so formed. And in the Universe, he doth not consider Things as if they were Pictures, formed by certain <hi rend="italic">Means</hi>, or <hi rend="italic">Or</hi><lb type="hyphenated" xml:id="l1"/><fw type="catch" place="bottomRight"><hi rend="italic">gans</hi>;</fw><pb xml:id="p13" n="13"/><hi rend="italic">gans</hi>; but as real Things, form'd by God himself, and seen by him in all Places whereever they are, without the Intervention of any <hi rend="italic">Medium</hi> at all. And this <hi rend="italic">Similitude</hi> is all that he means, when he supposes Infinite Space <note n="✝"><hi rend="italic">The Passage referred to is as follows</hi>. Annon Sensorium Animalium, est Locus cui Substantia sentiens adest, &amp; in quem sensibiles rerum Species per nervos &amp; cerebrum deferuntur, ut ibi præsentes à præsente sentiri possint? Atque – – – –annon ex Phænomenis constat, esse Entem Incorporeum, Viventem, Intelligentem, Omnipræsentem, qui in Spatio infinito, <hi rend="italic">Tanquam</hi> Sensorio suo, <hi rend="italic">Res Ipsas</hi> intime cernat, penitus<choice><abbr>q;</abbr><expan>que</expan></choice> perspiciat, totas<choice><abbr>q;</abbr><expan>que</expan></choice> intra se præsens præsentes complectatur; quarum quidem rerum, Id quod in Nobis sentit &amp; cogitat, <hi rend="italic">Imagines tantum</hi> ad se per <hi rend="italic">Organa</hi> Sensuum delatas, in Sensoriolo suo percipit &amp; contuetur? <hi rend="italic">i</hi>.<hi rend="italic">e</hi>. <hi rend="italic">Is not the Sensory of Animals the Place where the Perceptive Substance is present, and To which the Sensible</hi> Images <hi rend="italic">of Things are convey</hi>'<hi rend="italic">d by the Nerves and Brain that they may there be Perceived</hi>, <hi rend="italic">as being Present to the Perceptive Substance? And do not the</hi> Phænomena <hi rend="italic">of Nature show that there is an Incorporeal</hi>, <hi rend="italic">Living Intelligent</hi>, <hi rend="italic">Omnipresent Being who in the Infinite Space</hi>, <hi rend="italic">which is as it were His Sensorium</hi> (or <hi rend="italic">Place of Perception</hi>,) <hi rend="italic">sees and discerns in the inmost and most Thorough Manner</hi>, <hi rend="italic">the</hi> Very Things themselves, <hi rend="italic">and comprehends them as being entirely and immediately Present within Himself</hi>; <hi rend="italic">Of which Things the Perceptive and Thinking Substance that is in</hi> Us, <hi rend="italic">perceives and views in its Little Sensory</hi>, <hi rend="italic">nothing but the</hi> Images, <hi rend="italic">conveyed thither by the</hi> Organs <hi rend="italic">of the Senses?</hi> Newtoni Optice, Quæst. 20. pag. 315.</note> to be (<hi rend="italic">as it were</hi>) the <hi rend="italic">Sensorium</hi> of the Omnipresent Being. </p>
<p xml:id="par4">4. The Reason why, among <hi rend="italic">Men</hi>, an Artificer is justly esteemed so much the more <choice><sic>skilful</sic><corr>skillful</corr></choice>, as the Machine of his composing <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">will</fw><pb xml:id="p15" n="15"/>will continue longer to move regularly without any farther Interposition of the Workman; is because the skill of all <hi rend="italic">Human</hi> Artificers consists only in composing, adjusting, or putting together certain Movements, the <hi rend="italic">Principles</hi> of whose Motion are altogether independent upon the Artificer: Such as are <hi rend="italic">Weights</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Springs</hi>, and the like; whose forces are not <hi rend="italic">made</hi>, but only <hi rend="italic">adjusted</hi>, by the Workman. But with regard to <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, the Case is quite different; because <hi rend="italic">He</hi> not only composes or puts Things together, but is himself the Author and continual Preserver of their <hi rend="italic">Original Forces</hi> or <hi rend="italic">moving Powers</hi>: And consequently tis not a <hi rend="italic">diminution</hi>, but the true <hi rend="italic">Glory</hi> of his Workmanship, that <hi rend="italic">nothing</hi> is done without his <hi rend="italic">continual Government</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Inspection</hi>. The Notion of the World's being a great <hi rend="italic">Machine</hi>, going on <hi rend="italic">without the Interposition of God</hi>, as a Clock continues to go without the Assistance of a Clockmaker; is the Notion of <hi rend="italic">Materialism</hi> and <hi rend="italic">Fate</hi>, and tends, (under pretense of making God a <note n="*" place="marginRight"><hi rend="italic">See Appendix</hi>, N<hi rend="superscript">o</hi> 1.</note> <hi rend="italic">Supra-Mundane Intelligence</hi>,) to exclude <hi rend="italic">Providence</hi> and <hi rend="italic">God</hi>'<hi rend="italic">s Government</hi> in reality out of the World. And by the same Reason that a <hi rend="italic">Philosopher</hi> can represent all Things going on from the beginning of the Creation, <hi rend="italic">without</hi> any Government or Interposition of Providence; a <hi rend="italic">Sceptick</hi> will easily Argue still farther <fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">Backwards,</fw><pb xml:id="p17" n="17"/>Backwards, and suppose that Things have from Eternity gone on (as they now do) <hi rend="italic">without</hi> any true Creation or Original Author at all, but only what such Arguers call <hi rend="italic">All-Wise and Eternal Nature</hi>. If a <hi rend="italic">King</hi> had a <hi rend="italic">Kingdom</hi>, wherein all Things would continually go on <hi rend="italic">without</hi> his Government or Interposition, or <hi rend="italic">without</hi> his Attending to and Ordering what is done therein; It would be to <hi rend="italic">him</hi>, merely a <hi rend="italic">Nominal</hi> Kingdom; nor would he in reality deserve at all the Title of King or Governor. And as those Men, who pretend that in an Earthly Government Things may go on perfectly well <hi rend="italic">without</hi> the <hi rend="italic">King himself</hi> ordering or disposing of any Thing, may reasonably be suspected that they would like very well to set the King aside: So whosoever contends, that the Course of the World can go on <hi rend="italic">without</hi> the Continual direction of <hi rend="italic">God</hi>, the Supreme Governor; his Doctrine does in Effect tend to Exclude God out of the World. </p>
<fw type="catch" place="bottomRight">Mr. <hi rend="smallCaps">Leib</hi>-</fw>
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